Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: from variational to generalized Nash equilibrium
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.035zbMath1431.91263arXiv1812.02301OpenAlexW2902385229WikidataQ127254822 ScholiaQ127254822MaRDI QIDQ2282569
Clémence Alasseur, Hélène Le Cadre, Paulin Jacquot, Cheng Wan
Publication date: 8 January 2020
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.02301
preferencesgeneralized Nash equilibriumOR in energyvariational equilibriumpeer-to-peer energy trading
Noncooperative games (91A10) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)
Related Items (8)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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