Bidding collusion without passive updating

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.10.001zbMath1430.91048OpenAlexW2981095392WikidataQ127028720 ScholiaQ127028720MaRDI QIDQ2283135

Charles Z. Zheng

Publication date: 30 December 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.10.001

zbMATH Keywords

updatingcollusionfirst-price auctionasymmetric auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bribing in first-price auctions
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

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