Construction of a strong Nash equilibrium in a class of infinite nonzero-sum games

DOI10.1134/S008154381904014XzbMath1433.91015OpenAlexW2981140793WikidataQ126995331 ScholiaQ126995331MaRDI QIDQ2284206

Ya. B. Pankratova, Leon A. Petrosyan

Publication date: 14 January 2020

Published in: Proceedings of the Steklov Institute of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s008154381904014x

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremstrong Nash equilibriuminfinite multistage gamespunishment strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Non-cooperative games
• Multistage Games with Communication
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTISTAGE GAMES
• Game Theory

This page was built for publication: Construction of a strong Nash equilibrium in a class of infinite nonzero-sum games