Weighted committee games
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Publication:2286886
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.10.023zbMath1431.91141arXiv1712.03114OpenAlexW2772548197WikidataQ126995171 ScholiaQ126995171MaRDI QIDQ2286886
Publication date: 23 January 2020
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.03114
Related Items (5)
On anonymous and weighted voting systems ⋮ Weighted scoring committees ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ On the enumeration of bipartite simple games ⋮ The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?
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