Obvious manipulations
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Publication:2288530
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104970zbMath1430.91030OpenAlexW4256006281MaRDI QIDQ2288530
Publication date: 20 January 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104970
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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