Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-31489-7_3zbMath1431.91166OpenAlexW2979463581MaRDI QIDQ2290365

Anat Lerner, Rica Gonen

Publication date: 27 January 2020

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31489-7_3

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencydictatorshipincentive compatibilitybudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

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