Assessment of the key-reuse resilience of NewHope
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Publication:2290456
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-12612-4_14zbMath1464.94027OpenAlexW2914825969MaRDI QIDQ2290456
Aurélie Bauer, Mélissa Rossi, Guénaël Renault, Henri Gilbert
Publication date: 28 January 2020
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12612-4_14
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