Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.10.002zbMath1431.91056WikidataQ127093422 ScholiaQ127093422MaRDI QIDQ2291156

Pak Hung Au, Keiichi Kawai

Publication date: 30 January 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissionmultiple sendersBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (14)

Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy ⋮ Interactive Information Design ⋮ Auctions with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Competitive information disclosure in random search markets ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Sequential Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Competition in persuasion: an experiment ⋮ Submission costs in risk-taking contests ⋮ Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions ⋮ Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade? ⋮ Competitive disclosure of correlated information ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

Cites Work

• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Sequential cheap talks
• A Model of Expertise
• Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
• Competition in Persuasion
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control
• Sequential persuasion
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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