Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
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Publication:2291156
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.10.002zbMath1431.91056WikidataQ127093422 ScholiaQ127093422MaRDI QIDQ2291156
Publication date: 30 January 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (14)
Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy ⋮ Interactive Information Design ⋮ Auctions with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Competitive information disclosure in random search markets ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Sequential Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Competition in persuasion: an experiment ⋮ Submission costs in risk-taking contests ⋮ Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions ⋮ Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade? ⋮ Competitive disclosure of correlated information ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
Cites Work
- Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Sequential cheap talks
- A Model of Expertise
- Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
- Competition in Persuasion
- Strategic Information Transmission
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control
- Sequential persuasion
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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