Agency, potential and contagion

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.007zbMath1431.91065OpenAlexW2758160141MaRDI QIDQ2291157

Jonathan Newton, Damian Sercombe

Publication date: 30 January 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

potentialnetworkscontagionagency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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