Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.11.004zbMath1431.91030OpenAlexW2991986079MaRDI QIDQ2291180

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 30 January 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesrelational contractsmultimarket contactfavor exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship

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