Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2019.103794OpenAlexW2990106620WikidataQ126642788 ScholiaQ126642788MaRDI QIDQ2291788

Hiroshi Osano, Keiichi Hori

Publication date: 31 January 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103794

zbMATH Keywords

reference-dependent utilityexecutive compensationcontinuous-time agencymanagerial turnovermandatory deferral of incentive paystochastic replacement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion

Cites Work

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• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
• Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage
• Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
• Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
• Optimal Growth with Intertemporally Dependent Preferences

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