Securing infrastructure facilities: when does proactive defense help?
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Publication:2292114
DOI10.1007/s13235-018-0280-8zbMath1431.91032arXiv1804.00391OpenAlexW2964204689WikidataQ129333176 ScholiaQ129333176MaRDI QIDQ2292114
Publication date: 3 February 2020
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.00391
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Cites Work
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