Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
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Publication:2292120
DOI10.1007/s13235-019-00302-6zbMath1431.91034OpenAlexW2913763859MaRDI QIDQ2292120
Publication date: 3 February 2020
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00302-6
replicator dynamicsasymmetric evolutionary gamesgames with continuous strategy spaceLyapunov and asymptotic stabilityuninvadable profiles and sets
Stability of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D20) Asymptotic properties of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D05) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (3)
Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games ⋮ Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
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