Risk robust mechanism design for a prospect theoretic buyer

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_7zbMath1431.91092OpenAlexW2972655396MaRDI QIDQ2292617

J. Benjamin Miller, Alexandros Psomas, Si-Qi Liu

Publication date: 4 February 2020

Full work available at URL: https://rd.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-030-30473-7_7.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

prospect theorymechanism designrevenue maximizationrisk-neutral buyers and sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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