Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.020zbMath1429.91183OpenAlexW2955991893MaRDI QIDQ2292721

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 5 February 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.020

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsmoral hazardownership rightsinvestment incentivesrelationship specificity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (2)

Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory ⋮ \textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
• A formal model of firm boundaries and haggling
• Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
• The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• The Management of Innovation

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