On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108545zbMath1429.91235OpenAlexW2962647666MaRDI QIDQ2292744

Ziyang Shen, Zhen-Hua Jiao

Publication date: 5 February 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108545

zbMATH Keywords

top trading cycles mechanismaffirmative actionresponsivenessvirtual homogeneity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Responsive affirmative action in school choice
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• Competitive equilibria in school assignment
• Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
• On cores and indivisibility
• Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE

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