Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
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Publication:2293743
DOI10.1016/J.APM.2015.07.009zbMath1480.91073OpenAlexW1098579371MaRDI QIDQ2293743
Sukhwa Hong, Jeffrey D. Stillinger, Christian Wernz
Publication date: 5 February 2020
Published in: Applied Mathematical Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apm.2015.07.009
Stochastic programming (90C15) Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (4)
ESTIMATING COSTS OF MAINTENANCE SERVICE POLICY USING STEP-STRESS PARTIALLY ACCELERATED LIFE TESTING FOR LINDLEY DISTRIBUTION UNDER TYPE II CENSORING ⋮ A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard ⋮ Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach ⋮ Inference on maintenance service policy under step-stress partially accelerated life tests using progressive censoring
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