Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes

DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1141-9zbMath1432.91082OpenAlexW2888772137WikidataQ57920641 ScholiaQ57920641MaRDI QIDQ2294122

Jan U. Auerbach

Publication date: 10 February 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/34354

zbMATH Keywords

institutionsproperty rightsenforcementcostly falsification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites Work

• The market for protection and the origin of the state
• Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy
• Oligarchy, democracy, and state capacity
• Efficient contract enforcement
• State Capacity, Conflict, and Development

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