From pricing to prophets, and back!
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Publication:2294260
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2018.11.010zbMath1476.91069OpenAlexW2901729851MaRDI QIDQ2294260
Dana Pizarro, Patricio Foncea, José R. Correa, Víctor Verdugo
Publication date: 10 February 2020
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2018.11.010
Related Items (7)
Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms ⋮ Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms ⋮ Optimal revenue guarantees for pricing in large markets ⋮ Optimal prophet inequality with less than one sample ⋮ Prophet secretary through blind strategies ⋮ On Policies for Single-Leg Revenue Management with Limited Demand Information ⋮ Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals
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