On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108918zbMath1431.91160OpenAlexW2996636370MaRDI QIDQ2295367

Shao-Chieh Hsueh, Xiaoyong Cao, Wei Wang

Publication date: 13 February 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108918

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityfirst-price auctionsparticipation costsefficient cartel mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
• Asymmetric Auctions

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