On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.104992zbMath1432.91046OpenAlexW2995419972MaRDI QIDQ2295829

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó

Publication date: 17 February 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2019/96719.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

single-peakednessobvious strategy-proofnessgeneralized median voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof

Cites Work

• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Voting under constraints
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
• On cores and indivisibility
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
• OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF TOP TRADING CYCLES
• Voting by Committees
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities

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