Fair cake-cutting among families
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Publication:2296036
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01210-9zbMath1432.91068arXiv1510.03903OpenAlexW2798776840MaRDI QIDQ2296036
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan
Publication date: 17 February 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.03903
Related Items (10)
Almost envy-freeness for groups: improved bounds via discrepancy theory ⋮ Fair ride allocation on a line ⋮ Fairness for multi-self agents ⋮ Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation ⋮ When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist? ⋮ How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups ⋮ Computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items ⋮ Mind the gap: cake cutting with separation ⋮ Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting ⋮ Consensus Halving for Sets of Items
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