Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest

DOI10.1155/2019/9083023zbMath1453.91053OpenAlexW2990562344WikidataQ126623822 ScholiaQ126623822MaRDI QIDQ2296598

Yong Liu, Shaozeng Dong

Publication date: 18 February 2020

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/9083023

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Sad-loser contests
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
• Manipulations in contests
• Contests with insurance
• Contests with endogenous entry
• Contest architecture

This page was built for publication: Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest