Three-echelon supply chain contractual coordination with loss-averse multiple retailer preference

DOI10.1155/2019/4927302zbMath1435.90023OpenAlexW2975170346MaRDI QIDQ2298499

Azamat Rajapov, Saidjahon Hayrutdinov, Jian Ming

Publication date: 20 February 2020

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/4927302

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Cites Work

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