Research on price wars in supply chain networks based on multistage evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1155/2019/5106792zbMath1435.90027OpenAlexW2985156080WikidataQ126813833 ScholiaQ126813833MaRDI QIDQ2298519

Ermin Zhou, Xiangbin Xu

Publication date: 20 February 2020

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/5106792

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Uses Software

• Repast Suite

Cites Work

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• On the possibility of price wars when firms use a `tit-for-tat' strategy
• Spatial prisoner's dilemma optimally played in small-world networks
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Price competition with integrated and decentralized supply chains
• Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• The Evolution of Cooperation

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