Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information

DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09715-6zbMath1433.91076OpenAlexW2935751727MaRDI QIDQ2300604

Daniela Di Cagno, Andrej Angelovski, Francesca Marazzi, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 27 February 2020

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/28306/1/Theory%26Decision_Revised.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingprivate informationcheap talkacquiring-a-company game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Make-up and suspicion in bargaining with cheap talk: an experiment controlling for gender and gender constellation
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• Truth or Consequences: An Experiment
• What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods

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