Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing
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Publication:2304118
DOI10.1007/s10951-018-0587-8zbMath1431.90129OpenAlexW2894642475WikidataQ129150342 ScholiaQ129150342MaRDI QIDQ2304118
Publication date: 6 March 2020
Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-018-0587-8
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Combinatorial optimization (90C27)
Related Items (6)
Pareto optimal equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing ⋮ Selfish bin packing with punishment ⋮ Quality of equilibria for selfish bin packing with cost sharing variants ⋮ Selfish vector packing ⋮ Selfish bin packing with parameterized punishment ⋮ Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing
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