Highly efficient key exchange protocols with optimal tightness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2304946
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_25OpenAlexW2968515856MaRDI QIDQ2304946
Håkon Jacobsen, Kristian Gjøsteen, Katriel Cohn-Gordon, Tibor Jager, C. J. F. Cremers
Publication date: 9 March 2020
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2637773
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