A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
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Publication:2305047
DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1149-1zbMath1443.91137OpenAlexW2891013291WikidataQ129266358 ScholiaQ129266358MaRDI QIDQ2305047
Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
Publication date: 10 March 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1149-1
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