Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
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Publication:2306268
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.08.005zbMath1435.91124OpenAlexW2970730354MaRDI QIDQ2306268
Publication date: 20 March 2020
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.08.005
anonymityprobabilistic serial mechanismrandom assignmentordinal efficiencykidney exchangecompatible pairs
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Cites Work
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