Principal-agent problem for returns handling in a reverse supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing dealers

DOI10.1016/J.APM.2018.09.012zbMath1481.90073OpenAlexW2891489779WikidataQ129253822 ScholiaQ129253822MaRDI QIDQ2307134

Jiao-Jiao Li, Da-jiang Wang, Xiao-ying Ma, Duo-Qing Sun

Publication date: 27 March 2020

Published in: Applied Mathematical Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apm.2018.09.012

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssupply chain managementfixed-point theoremprincipal-agent problemincentive contractreturns handling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (1)

An optimal put option contract for a reverse supply chain: case of remanufacturing capacity uncertainty

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