An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

DOI10.3390/g10030031zbMath1435.91053OpenAlexW2964432508MaRDI QIDQ2307359

Ruben Juarez, Karl Jandoc

Publication date: 27 March 2020

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030031

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcoalition formationself-enforcementpower accumulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Robust equilibria in tournaments ⋮ An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

Uses Software

• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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