An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2307359
DOI10.3390/g10030031zbMath1435.91053OpenAlexW2964432508MaRDI QIDQ2307359
Publication date: 27 March 2020
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030031
Related Items (2)
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- A test of the core, bargaining set, kernel and Shapley models in N-person quota games with one weak player
- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
- An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
- Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements?
- Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- Endogenous coalition formation in contests
- Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
- Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies
- Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
This page was built for publication: An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions