Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games

DOI10.1007/s13675-019-00114-8zbMath1435.91045OpenAlexW2946633660WikidataQ127863660 ScholiaQ127863660MaRDI QIDQ2308184

Nicola Gatti, Nicola Basilico, Stefano Coniglio, Alberto Marchesi

Publication date: 25 March 2020

Published in: EURO Journal on Computational Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13675-019-00114-8

zbMATH Keywords

game theorybilevel programmingStackelberg gamesequilibrium computation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (6)

Energy storage operation and electricity market design: on the market power of monopolistic storage operators ⋮ On computation of optimal strategies in oligopolistic markets respecting the cost of change ⋮ Airport capacity extension, fleet investment, and optimal aircraft scheduling in a multilevel market model: quantifying the costs of imperfect markets ⋮ Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy ⋮ Computing a pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: the mixed-pure case ⋮ A Unified Framework for Multistage Mixed Integer Linear Optimization

Uses Software

• GAMUT

Cites Work

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• Bilevel Knapsack with Interdiction Constraints
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• Multiagent Systems
• Jointly Constrained Biconvex Programming
• Computability of global solutions to factorable nonconvex programs: Part I — Convex underestimating problems
• Bilevel Programming Approaches to the Computation of Optimistic and Pessimistic Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Equilibria.
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Bilevel programming and price setting problems

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