Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01183-XzbMath1435.91115OpenAlexW2272122242MaRDI QIDQ2308796

Toshihiko Mukoyama, Latchezar Popov

Publication date: 3 April 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2015/paper_1275.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

industrializationincomplete contractinstitutionmisallocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (1)

Contracts, firm dynamics, and aggregate productivity

Cites Work

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• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development
• Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable
• Productive government expenditures and long-run growth
• Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
• Oligarchy, democracy, and state capacity
• Efficient contract enforcement
• Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade
• Time-Consistent Public Policy
• Courts
• Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production*

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