Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01184-WzbMath1435.91099OpenAlexW2797975009WikidataQ128145465 ScholiaQ128145465MaRDI QIDQ2308797

Sébastien Mitraille, Henry Thille

Publication date: 3 April 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2017/2017-08.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyoligopolyadvance salesovercommitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods
• Capacity and Entry Under Demand Uncertainty

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