Environmental policy regulation and corporate compliance in evolutionary game models with well-mixed and structured populations

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.05.040zbMath1431.91269arXiv1802.09406OpenAlexW2952974940WikidataQ109152122 ScholiaQ109152122MaRDI QIDQ2312342

Gabriel Meyer Salomão, André Barreira da Silva Rocha

Publication date: 5 July 2019

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.09406

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycellular automataagent-based modelOR in environment and climate changestructured complex systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks ⋮ Evolutionary behaviors regarding pricing and payment-convenience strategies with uncertain risk ⋮ Large-scale group decision-making with non-cooperative behaviors and heterogeneous preferences: an application in financial inclusion ⋮ Firm response to ethically motivated boycotts ⋮ Who will pay for the ``bicycle cemetery? Evolutionary game analysis of recycling abandoned shared bicycles under dynamic reward and punishment

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• The evolutionary dynamics of audit
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• Supply chain disruption management and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers in the quantity-setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods
• Evolutionary Games in Complex Topologies
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks

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