Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes

DOI10.1007/S00199-017-1083-7zbMath1422.91037OpenAlexW2767417385MaRDI QIDQ2315347

Eddie Dekel, Ady Pauzner

Publication date: 2 August 2019

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1083-7

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitysymmetry breakingmonotone comparative staticsstrategic substitutesuniqueness of equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (2)

Special issue: Supermodularity and monotone methods in economics ⋮ On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information

Cites Work

• On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
• Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
• Monotone comparative statics for games with strategic substitutes
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: a synthesis
• A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
• Aggregate comparative statics
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibria in symmetric games: Theory and applications

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