Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-64659-6zbMath1429.91003OpenAlexW2764113219MaRDI QIDQ2315452

Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 5 August 2019

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://rd.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-64659-6.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

voting theorymajority ruleBorda rulevoting paradoxesCondorcet loserapproval vote

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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