Supplier's strategy: align with the dominant entrant retailer or the vulnerable incumbent retailer?

DOI10.1007/S00500-018-3008-1zbMath1418.90042OpenAlexW2789575878MaRDI QIDQ2317639

Ye Wang, Ruiqing Zhao, Wansheng Tang

Publication date: 12 August 2019

Published in: Soft Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-018-3008-1

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysupply chaininformation leakagedominant retailerinformation concealment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)

Related Items (3)

Equilibrium analysis of marketing strategies in supply chain with marketing efforts induced demand considering free riding ⋮ Designing buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) contract of dual-channel low-carbon supply chain considering consumers' low-carbon preference ⋮ Optimal ordering decision and information leakage preference under asymmetric forecast signal

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• Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain
• Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

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