A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
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Publication:2317999
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.09.001zbMath1422.91234OpenAlexW2789870016WikidataQ129235121 ScholiaQ129235121MaRDI QIDQ2317999
Publication date: 13 August 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42751/7/tr193.pdf
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