Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance

DOI10.1007/s10058-017-0202-zzbMath1422.91319OpenAlexW256374745WikidataQ59614889 ScholiaQ59614889MaRDI QIDQ2318124

Makoto Shimoji

Publication date: 13 August 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z

zbMATH Keywords

weak dominancerevenue comparisondiscrete private-value auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions

Cites Work

• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
• On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
• Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
• Optimal Auction Design
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Asymmetric Auctions
• A Comment on “Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study”
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Admissibility in Games

This page was built for publication: Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance