Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
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Publication:2318124
DOI10.1007/s10058-017-0202-zzbMath1422.91319OpenAlexW256374745WikidataQ59614889 ScholiaQ59614889MaRDI QIDQ2318124
Publication date: 13 August 2019
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z
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Cites Work
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- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Admissibility in Games
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