Stable cost sharing in production allocation games

DOI10.1007/s10058-018-0209-0zbMath1422.91384OpenAlexW2212959650WikidataQ130112632 ScholiaQ130112632MaRDI QIDQ2318129

Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau

Publication date: 13 August 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-018-0209-0

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityreturns to scalecost sharinghomogeneous pricesproduction allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation ⋮ Sharing pollution permits under welfare upper bounds ⋮ Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game? ⋮ A cost sharing example in which subsidies are necessary for stability

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