Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
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Publication:2319628
DOI10.1007/s00453-019-00584-7zbMath1431.91257arXiv1404.5245OpenAlexW3103278015WikidataQ127833492 ScholiaQ127833492MaRDI QIDQ2319628
Piotr Krysta, Baharak Rastegari, Jinshan Zhang, David F. Manlove
Publication date: 20 August 2019
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.5245
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (8)
Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas ⋮ Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship ⋮ Decomposing random mechanisms ⋮ Tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching ⋮ Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties ⋮ On the complexity of fair house allocation ⋮ Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial ⋮ A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
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