Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
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Publication:2323294
DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1119-7zbMath1422.91149OpenAlexW2801693572MaRDI QIDQ2323294
Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 30 August 2019
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1119-7
2-person games (91A05) Games involving graphs (91A43) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
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