On the efficiency of local electricity markets under decentralized and centralized designs: a multi-leader Stackelberg game analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2323427
DOI10.1007/s10100-018-0521-3OpenAlexW2786750492MaRDI QIDQ2323427
Publication date: 2 September 2019
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-018-0521-3
Related Items
Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A generalized Nash equilibrium model of market coupling in the European power system
- Wind farm portfolio optimization under network capacity constraints
- Complementarity modeling in energy markets
- A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games
- Is bilevel programming a special case of a mathematical program with complementarity constraints?
- An overview of bilevel optimization
- On P- and S-functions and related classes of \(n\)-dimensional nonlinear mappings
- Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network
- Computing Cournot-Nash Equilibria
- A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
- Annotated Bibliography on Bilevel Programming and Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
- Bilevel Programming Problems
- A Comparison of Electricity Market Designs in Networks
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- The complementarity problem
- Zermelo and the early history of game theory
