Quantifying and mitigating inefficiency in information acquisition under competition

DOI10.1007/S10100-018-0529-8OpenAlexW2793794562MaRDI QIDQ2323428

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 2 September 2019

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-018-0529-8

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionreturn on investmentconsumer surplusefficiency lossdifferentiated competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Related Items (1)

The concept of the qualitology and grey system theory application in marketing information quality cognition and assessment

Cites Work

• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management
• Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists
• Optimal information acquisition for heterogeneous duopoly firms
• Sharing Demand Information in Competing Supply Chains with Production Diseconomies
• Supply chain disruption risk management through strategic information acquisition and sharing and risk-sharing contracts
• Do Firms Invest in Forecasting Efficiently? The Effect of Competition on Demand Forecast Investments and Supply Chain Coordination
• Market Information and Firm Performance
• Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning
• Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination
• Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets

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