Incitements for transportation collaboration by cost allocation

DOI10.1007/s10100-018-0530-2OpenAlexW2177115165WikidataQ130168166 ScholiaQ130168166MaRDI QIDQ2323429

Mikael Rönnqvist, Joen Dahlberg, Stefan Engevall, Maud Göthe-Lundgren, Kurt O. Jørnsten

Publication date: 2 September 2019

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-018-0530-2

zbMATH Keywords

cost allocationcooperative game theorytransportation planningcollaborationmonotonic path

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Related Items (2)

A game-theoretic multi-stakeholder model for cost allocation in urban consolidation centres ⋮ The prisoners' dilemma in collaborative carriers' request selection

Uses Software

• Gurobi
• Python

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• A procedure for finding the nucleolus of a cooperativen person game
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation

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