Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder

DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1077-5zbMath1422.91302OpenAlexW2608953981MaRDI QIDQ2323575

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Publication date: 3 September 2019

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1077-5

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationinnovationlicensingoptimal contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Finding an optimal selection in diversify combating modes for desertification region ⋮ On the diffusion of competing innovations ⋮ Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information

Cites Work

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• Kumaraswamy's distribution: a beta-type distribution with some tractability advantages
• License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
• Optimal licensing of uncertain patents in the shadow of litigation
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Licensing process innovations when losers' messages determine royalty rates
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Sufficient Conditions in Optimal Control Theory
• The Reversed Hazard Rate Function

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