Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection
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Publication:2323617
DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1101-4zbMath1422.91366OpenAlexW2785573597MaRDI QIDQ2323617
Publication date: 3 September 2019
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1101-4
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Related Items (2)
Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection ⋮ On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
Cites Work
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- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
- An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.
- INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION
- Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons
- Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
- Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a Market with Asymmetric Information
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- Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
- Informational Equilibrium
- Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
- Optimal Income Taxation with Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
- Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
- Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
- Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
- A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION
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