Epistemic logic, monotonicity, and the Halbach-Welch rapprochement strategy

DOI10.1007/s11225-018-9811-yOpenAlexW2852948273WikidataQ129524762 ScholiaQ129524762MaRDI QIDQ2323637

Kyle Banick

Publication date: 3 September 2019

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9811-y

zbMATH Keywords

modal logicepistemic logicintensional logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical logic and foundations (03-XX)

Cites Work

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• A paradox regained
• Basic conditional logic
• The knower paradox and epistemic closure
• The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic
• Epistemic closure and epistemic logic. I: Relevant alternatives and subjunctivism
• Variations on a Montagovian theme
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• Elusive Knowledge
• Epistemic Logic with Evidence and Relevant Alternatives

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